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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This civil rights action mounts a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a practice of the Philadelphia District 





Rule 5021 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that a criminal proceeding may"be 
instituted by . . . an arrest without a warrant" if there is 
probable cause to believe that the subject has committed a 
felony. Pa. R. Crim. P. 502. In the case of a warrantless 
arrest, a complaint is filed and a "preliminary arraignment" 
is held "without unnecessary delay." Pa. R. Crim. P. 518(a). 
A reference in the commentary of the Rules to County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), makes clear 
that under ordinary circumstances the preliminary 
arraignment must be held within 48 hours. See  Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 540(C). At the preliminary arraignment, a neutral 
magistrate "makes a determination of probable cause." Pa. 
R. Crim. P. 540(C), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 540(C). If he 
determines that probable cause does not exist, the subject 
is discharged. Id. Otherwise, bail is set and a date for a 
preliminary hearing is fixed no "less than 3 nor more than 
10 days after the preliminary arraignment." Pa. R. Crim. P. 
540(E)(1). If the Commonwealth presents a "prima facie 
case" at the preliminary hearing, the subject is held over for 
trial. Pa. R. Crim. P. 543. If "a prima facie  case of the 
defendant's guilt is not established at the preliminary 
hearing, and no . . . continuance" is granted, the charge is 
dismissed and the subject is discharged. Pa. R. Crim. P. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On March 1, 2000, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania signed an 
order authorizing the reorganization and renumbering of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. This order became effective 
on April 1, 2001. We use the current numbering system throughout this 
opinion. 
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542(D). Under Rule 544(a), "[w]hen charges are dismissed 
. . . at . . . a preliminary hearing, the attorney for the 
Commonwealth may reinstitute the charges by approving, 
in writing, the refiling of a complaint." Pa. R. Crim. P. 
544(a). 
 
Under the challenged rearrest policy, the District 
Attorney, from time to time when she concludes she has 
probable cause, reinitiates criminal charges that have been 
dismissed at a preliminary hearing by rearresting the 
subject and refiling a complaint pursuant to the authority 
of Rules 518 and 544. The person arrested is then held to 
await a new preliminary arraignment within 48 hours. Cash 
or property posted on the initial arrest is applied against 
the bail set at that arraignment.2 This reinitiation of a 
criminal proceeding occurs without a judicial determination 
that the District Attorney has probable cause to believe that 
the subject has committed a felony. Because no prima facie 
case has been presented at the preliminary hearing in such 
cases and because there has been no judicial finding of 
probable cause prior to the rearrest, rearrests pursuant to 
the District Attorney's policy are here challenged as 
unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 3 
 
Plaintiff/Appellee Robert Stewart brought this S 1983 
action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. 
The District Court granted class certification and enjoined 
the District Attorney from employing the rearrest policy. 
The certified class was defined as follows: 
 
       All persons who have been or will in the future be 
       subjected to the practice and policy of the . . . 
       [Philadelphia] District Attorney of re-arresting, without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically 
address the issue posed by the imposition of bail following re-arrest. 
However, the record indicates that in May 2000, the Municipal Court of 
Philadelphia, with the agreement and cooperation of the District 
Attorney's Office and the Defender Association, instituted a policy 
permitting bail posted on an initial arrest to be credited to bail set as 
a 
result of a re-arrest. 
 
3. The District Attorney's rearrest policy is not challenged here as 
violative of Pennsylvania law and, accordingly, we assume for present 
purposes that it is consistent with that law. 
 
                                4 
 
 
       judicial authorization, persons whose criminal charges 
       have been dismissed by a Philadelphia Municipal Court 
       Judge based on a determination that the 
       Commonwealth had not established, by reason of lack 
       of evidence or lack of prosecution, probable cause to 
       hold the criminal case for trial. 
 
The District Court's injunction prohibited the District 
Attorney from "ordering the re-arrest and detention, 
without judicial authorization, of any persons on any 
charge which has been dismissed by a Philadelphia 
Municipal Court judge at a preliminary hearing because of 
the failure of the Commonwealth . . . to establish probable 





Stewart was arrested and charged with one count of the 
felony of aggravated assault, and with misdemeanor counts 
of simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, 
and possession of an instrument of crime. One day after his 
arrest, Stewart was preliminarily arraigned and released on 
bail. A preliminary hearing was subsequently held in 
Philadelphia Municipal Court. At the conclusion of that 
hearing, the presiding judge ruled that the Commonwealth 
had not presented a prima facie case against Stewart on the 
felony count. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the felony 
count of aggravated assault and scheduled Stewart's case 
for trial on the remaining misdemeanor counts only. The 
Assistant District Attorney who was prosecuting Stewart in 
the courtroom immediately reinitiated an identical felony 
charge of aggravated assault. The allegations of the new 
complaint were identical to those in the complaint that had 
just been dismissed. Police re-arrested Stewart on the 
"dismissed" charge, and detained him for another 
preliminary hearing. Because Stewart was not able to make 
the bail set at his second preliminary arraignment, he 
remained in jail for approximately two weeks until his 
second preliminary hearing was held. Stewart filed this civil 
rights action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 while he was in 
custody awaiting the second preliminary hearing. 
 





The District Attorney first argues that the District Court 
should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction 
under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
The District Court decided not to abstain, and we conclude 
that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 
 
Younger was arrested under a state criminal statute 
which allegedly violated his right to free speech under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. While the state charges 
were still pending, Younger filed an action in federal court 
to enjoin his prosecution. The District Court agreed that 
the statute was void for vagueness and overbroad in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
enjoined the District Attorney from enforcing it. See id. at 
40. The Supreme Court reversed. It held, based on 
principles of equity and federalism, that a federal court 
should not enjoin a state criminal proceeding without a 
showing that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury 
"both great and immediate." Id. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. 
Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926)). This standard cannot be met, 
the Court said, if "the threat to the plaintiff 's federally 
protected rights . . . [can be addressed] by his defense 
against a single criminal prosecution." Id.  at 46. 
 
In Younger, the federal plaintiff requested that the 
District Court find unconstitutional the law under which 
the government was prosecuting him and thereby foreclose 
his prosecution. In this case, the equitable relief requested 
is not aimed at state prosecutions, but at the legality of the 
re-arrest policy and the pretrial detention of a class of 
criminal defendants. The issues here raised could not have 
been raised in defense of Stewart's criminal prosecution, 
and the injunction sought would not bar his prosecution. 
 
We conclude that the Court's application of Younger in 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), controls our 
resolution of the abstention issue here. The defendants in 
Gerstein were arrested pursuant to a prosecutor's 
information. Under applicable Florida rules and statutes, 
prosecutors could charge noncapital offenses by 
information without a preliminary hearing or leave of court. 
The Florida courts had previously held that the prosecutor's 
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filing of an information "foreclosed the suspect's right to a 
preliminary hearing." Id. at 106. 
 
Several arrestees detained under this procedure filed a 
class action against county officials in federal District Court 
alleging that they had "a constitutional right to a judicial 
hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting 
declaratory and injunctive relief." Id. at 107. The State of 
Florida argued that Younger compelled abstention because 
federal action would interfere with state proceedings by 
requiring the state to grant prompt probable cause hearings 
contrary to the state's own rules and procedures. The Court 
unanimously rejected that argument. The Court stated: 
 
       The District Court correctly held that respondents' 
       claim for relief was not barred by the equitable 
       restrictions on federal intervention in state 
       prosecutions[ ] [under] Younger v. Harris. The 
       injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions 
       as such, but only at the legality of the pretrial 
       detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that 
       could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
       prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings 
       could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the 
       merits. 
 
Id. at 108 n.9 (citations omitted, emphasis added). We find 
the situation before us analogous to that before the 
Supreme Court in Gerstein. 
 
We also find the Supreme Court's subsequent 
characterization of Gerstein to be helpful here. In Moore v. 
Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), the Court distinguished 
Gerstein from the case before it on the following ground: 
 
       The reliance on Gerstein is misplaced. That case 
       involved a challenge to pretrial restraint on the basis of 
       a prosecutor's information alone, without the benefit of 
       a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer. 
       This Court held that the District Court properly found 
       that the action was not barred by Younger because the 
       injunction was not addressed to a state proceeding and 
       therefore would not interfere with the criminal 
       prosecutions themselves. "The order to hold 
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       preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct 
       of the trial on the merits." 
 
442 U.S. at 431 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 n.9). 
That is precisely the situation here. 
 





To obtain certification, Stewart was required to show that 
the purported class met the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
and at least one of the elements of Rule 23(b). See Baby 
Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3d Cir. 1994). Rule 23(a) 
states: 
 
       One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
       as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the 
       class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
       impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
       common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
       representative parties are typical of the claims or 
       defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties 
       will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
       class. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The District Attorney argues that 
Stewart's claim fails to meet the (1) numerosity, (2) 
commonality, and (3) typicality elements required for class 
certification under Rule 23(a). She concedes that the named 
class representative will adequately represent the interest of 
absent class members as is required under Rule 23(4). 
 
Rule 23(b)(2) provides for class certification where the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and "the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. 




No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain 
a suit as a class action, but generally if the named plaintiff 
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demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs 
exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met. See 
5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
S 23.22[3][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1999). Here, both 
parties concede that, prior to the injunction, the District 
Attorney had re-arrested 67 defendants under Rule 544 
pursuant to the disputed policy. Forty-one of those 
defendants had been discharged for lack of evidence and 
the resulting failure to establish probable cause. The 
number of class members will increase further if the policy 
continues in force. Accordingly, plaintiffs satisfy the 




"The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge. Both criteria seek to assure that 
the action can be practically and efficiently maintained and 
that the interests of the absentees will be fairly and 
adequately represented. Despite their similarity, however, 
commonality and typicality are distinct requirements under 
Rule 23." Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d at 56 (internal 
citations omitted). "The commonality requirement will be 
satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question 
of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The District Attorney argues that circumstances among 
the potential class members vary to such an extent that 
there is no commonality. She reminds us that defendants 
can have their charges dismissed at the preliminary hearing 
for many different reasons. The District Attorney also 
argues that a discharge for a lack of prosecution, in which 
the charges are dismissed because the government cannot 
produce a necessary witness and the court does not grant 
a continuance, differs from a discharge for a lack of 
evidence, in which the government fails to make a prima 
facie case. She insists that these "dissimilar" situations 
cannot be included in the instant class certification. 
 
However, this argument fails to recognize that, despite 
the differences that undoubtedly exist from case to case, 
common issues of law and fact predominate. The class is 
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defined such that each class member had his/her criminal 
case discharged by a judicial officer and was then re- 
arrested based solely upon the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, without any judicial determination of probable 
cause for the arrest. The District Court specifically enjoined 
re-arrest of persons against whom charges have been 
dismissed at the preliminary hearing because of failure to 
establish probable cause or a prima facie case. Therefore, 
"at least one question of fact or law" is common to each 




The typicality inquiry centers on whether the interests of 
the named plaintiffs align with the interests of the absent 
members. See 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice S 23.24[1]; Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pearce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,183 (3d. Cir. 2001) ("The 
typicality inquiry . . . centers on whether the named 
plaintiffs' individual circumstances are markedly different 
or . . . the legal theory upon which the claims are based 
differs from that upon which the claims of other class 
members will perforce be based.") (citation omitted). 
"[C]ases challenging the same unlawful conduct which 
affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 
usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the 
varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims." 
Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (citation omitted)."Factual 
differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim 
arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct 
that gives rise to the claims of the [absent] class members, 
and if it is based on the same legal theory." Hoxworth v. 
Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 
1992) (quoting 1 Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class 
Actions S 3.15 at 168 (2d ed. 1985)). Here, Stewart 
challenges the District Attorney's re-arrest policy and the 
constitutionality of that policy is at the heart of each of the 
absent members claims. 
 
D. Rule 23(b)(2) 
 
Rule 23(b)(2) is designed primarily to authorize class 
action treatment for cases like the one before us that seek 
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injunctive relief. See Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58. Moreover, it 
is generally recognized that civil rights actions seeking relief 
on behalf of classes like the putative class normally meet 
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). See id. at 59 ("[T]he 
injunctive class provision was `designed specifically for civil 
rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief 
for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous 
class of persons.' ") (citations omitted). Finally, Baby Neal 
teaches that courts should look to whether "the relief 
sought by the named plaintiffs [will] benefit the entire 
class." Id. at 59. Here, Stewart seeks injunctive relief in a 
civil rights claim and the relief sought could benefit the 
entire class. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in certifying this litigation as a class action. 




The applicable Fourth Amendment law "represents a 
necessary accommodation between the individual's right to 
liberty and the State's duty to control crime." Gerstein, 420 
U.S. at 112. From the individual's perspective, that 
accommodation provides that he or she may not be 
arrested in the absence of probable cause and may not be 
detained for over 48 hours without a neutral magistrate's 
review of that probable cause determination. See Gerstein, 
420 U.S. at 114; County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. 
Conversely, from the state's perspective, that 
accommodation provides that a state may arrest and detain 
an individual without a warrant if it has probable cause 
and provides for review of the probable cause determination 
by a neutral party within 48 hours of the arrest. Id. It is the 
function of the reviewing neutral magistrate to determine 
"whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of 
the arrest would `warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief ' that an offense has been committed." Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 
The record does not establish that Stewart or any 
member of the class was deprived of anything that this 
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constitutional accommodation guarantees them. It does not 
establish that the officer initially arresting Stewart (or any 
member of the class) or the officer rearresting Stewart (or 
any member of the class) lacked information at the time of 
the arrest that would "warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that an offense had been committed." Id. Nor 
does the record establish that Stewart (or any member of 
the class) was detained for a total of more than 48 hours 
without a review of the probable cause determinations by a 
neutral magistrate. These facts should have ended the 
matter and mandated summary judgment in defendants' 
favor. The Pennsylvania law requiring probable cause for 
arrests and a preliminary arraignment within 48 hours 
satisfies all that the Fourth Amendment requires, and there 
is no reason to believe that law was not fully complied with 
here. See Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 678 A.2d 342, 
347-48, n.10 (Pa. 1996) (noting that Pennsylvania's pretrial 
process up through the preliminary arraignment addresses 
the constitutional requirements of Gerstein and County of 
Riverside).4 
 
What Stewart asks us to do is to deprive Pennsylvania of 
its right to reinitiate a criminal proceeding in accordance 
with a generally applicable process that is entirely 
consistent with the dictates of the applicable Fourth 
Amendment law. There is no precedent of which we are 
aware, however, for the proposition that the federal 
Constitution prohibits the reinitiation of a criminal 
proceeding in such a manner where double jeopardy has 
not attached and no pattern of prosecutorial harassment 
has been alleged.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Stewart's rearrest, of course, would have violated the Fourth 
Amendment had it been made without probable cause. The same would 
be true with respect to an arrest of any member of the class without 
probable cause. Stewart has not attempted to show, however, that the 
district attorney lacked probable cause at the time of his arrest or 
anyone else's. The record does not reveal, for example, what information 
was presented to the neutral magistrate at Stewart's second preliminary 
arraignment and was there found to constitute probable cause. 
5. As the commentary to Pa. R. Crim. P. 544 explains, the Pennsylvania 
"courts have held that the reinstitution [of a prosecution under that 
rule] 
may be barred [when] the Commonwealth has repeatedly rearrested the 
defendant in order to harass him . . . ." Pa. R. Crim. P. 544 cmt. (citing 
Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 701 A.2d 488 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Shoop, 617 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. 1992)). No pattern of harassment is 
alleged here. 
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Stewart's argument is predicated on the proposition that 
the federal Constitution requires Pennsylvania to give 
preclusive effect to the disposition of a municipal judge at 
a preliminary hearing unless and until there is a finding of 
probable cause in a subsequent judicial proceeding. This 
novel proposition and the arguments advanced in support 
of it are unpersuasive. 
 
Contrary to Stewart's repeated assertions, there is 
nothing inherently inconsistent between a finding that the 
Commonwealth has failed to establish a prima facie case at 
the preliminary hearing and the existence of probable cause 
for a second arrest. 
 
First, it is not at all clear to us that the "probable cause" 
standard and the "prima facie case" standard under 
Pennsylvania law require the Commonwealth to provide the 
same level of assurance that the subject has committed a 
crime. The different terms chosen to describe the 
Commonwealth's burden at the time of arrest and 
preliminary arraignment and its burden at the time of the 
preliminary hearings, suggest to us that prima facie case 
standard was intended to require different and greater 
assurance of guilt. "Probable cause," of course, speaks in 
terms of a probability while "prima facie case" has been 
defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as evidence 
"such that if presented at the trial in court, and accepted 
as true, the judge would be warranted in letting the trial go 
to the jury." Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 
(Pa. 1983) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, 
while the Commonwealth need not convince the preliminary 
hearing judge of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it must 
nonetheless present admissible evidence at the preliminary 
hearing that would warrant a reasonable jury in finding 
each of the elements of the offense by that standard. Id. It 
is thus not surprising to find Pennsylvania cases 
recognizing that the standard of probable cause and the 
prima facie case standard are conceptually distinct. See 
Commonwealth v. Cartegena, 393 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1978) 
(plurality opinion) (finding that probable cause had existed 
for the institution of criminal proceedings, though a prima 
facie case had not been established); Commonwealth v. 
Days, 718 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating in the 
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context of affirming that a magistrate properly determined 
that probable cause existed to issue a search warrant that 
"[p]robable cause is based on a finding of probability, not a 
prima facie showing of criminal activity"); Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 420 A.2d 717, 720 (Pa. Super. 1980) ("It would be 
unreasonable to require payment of costs every time the 
Commonwealth wanted to challenge a finding of lack of 
prima facie case when there had not even been a hint of 
harassment or failure to show probable cause."). 
 
Even if "probable cause" and "prima facie case" are 
coterminus standards, however, we would nevertheless 
conclude that there is nothing inherently inconsistent 
between a failure of the Commonwealth to establish a prima 
facie case at the preliminary hearing and the existence of 
probable cause for a second arrest. The database that the 
Commonwealth may consult in determining whether there 
is probable cause for a second arrest is different from, and 
more comprehensive than, the database to which 
consideration is limited at the preliminary hearing. 
 
First, in determining whether there is probable cause for 
a second arrest the prosecutor is entitled to consider any 
information known to him that a reasonably prudent man 
might regard as reliable. See McKibben v. Schmotzer, 700 
A.2d 484, 492 (Pa. 1997) (defining probable cause as"a 
reasonable ground or suspicion supported by 
circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent 
man in the same situation in believing that the party is 
guilty of the offense"). By way of contrast, the presiding 
judge at a preliminary hearing must find that the 
Commonwealth has not presented a prima facie case unless 
it has produced information in legally admissible form 
substantiating each element of the offense. See 
Commonwealth ex rel Buchanan v. Verbovitz, 581 A.2d 172, 
174 (Pa. 1990) (holding that where the Commonwealth 
relied upon inadmissible hearsay to establish a prima facie 
case, it did not meet its burden of producing at the 
preliminary hearing "legally competent evidence to 
demonstrate the existence of facts which connect the 
accused to the crime charged"). 
 
Second, the database available to the prosecutor is 
different from that available to the judge determining the 
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prima facie case issue because a prima facie  case can exist 
only on the basis of legally admissible evidence presented in 
court at the time preliminary hearing, while probable cause 
can exist on the basis of all the reliable information known 
to the prosecution at the time of the second arrest. The 
District Attorney notes, for example, that the most frequent 
reason for a re-arrest is the failure of a witness to appear 
who the Commonwealth has reason to believe can provide 
important evidence of guilt. In such a situation, a 
determination that a prima facie case has not been 
presented is not inconsistent with the existence of probable 
cause for immediate re-arrest. Moreover, given that 
preliminary hearings are often held while the investigation 
of the crime is continuing, it will frequently be the case that 
the Commonwealth will gain additional knowledge of 
incriminating evidence within minutes or hours after the 
preliminary hearing concludes. The District Court's 
injunction bars the District Attorney from ever  reinitiating 
charges without prior judicial approval, no matter how 
much additional incriminating information she learns in 
the course of her investigation. 
 
More fundamentally, however, even if there were some 
necessary inconsistency between a finding that the 
Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case at the 
preliminary hearing and the existence of probable cause for 
rearrest, we would still be unable to find anything in the 
United States Constitution that requires a state to give 
collateral effect to a preliminary hearing finding so as to 
preclude the state from reinitiating the prosecution in the 
normal manner. As the District Court concluded, 
traditional principles of res judicata would not appear to 
require that collateral effect be given to a preliminary 
hearing disposition,6 but even if that were not the case, 
Pennsylvania would be free, within the limits of due 
process, to fashion its own rules of preclusion. 
 
In summary, Pennsylvania's requirement that a criminal 
prosecution may not go forward unless the state presents 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 393 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1978) (holding 
that rearrest was proper even though the same charge was dismissed at 
prior preliminary hearing). 
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evidence constituting a prima facie case of guilt before a 
magistrate at the time of the preliminary hearing is not 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment under Gerstein and County of Riverside. If 
Pennsylvania chooses to impose this additional 
requirement, there is, of course, no federal constitutional 
impediment to its doing so. Nor, of course, is there any 
constitutional mandate that it do so. 
 
What Stewart asks us to do is to take a Pennsylvania 
hearing process that is not constitutionally required and 
fashion a federal constitutional rule giving collateral effect 
to the magistrate's ruling at that hearing so as to bar the 
state from exercising its right to arrest when it believes in 
good faith that it has probable cause. This proposed rule 
appears to be based solely on an appeal that respect be 
accorded the authority of the municipal judge who presides 
at the preliminary hearing. While Pennsylvania could, if it 
so chose, accord such respect to a judge's prima facie case 
ruling, we find nothing in the United States Constitution 




The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, and 
this matter will be remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Given the early stage at which a preliminary hearing occurs and the 
fluid state of affairs that frequently exist at that stage, Pennsylvania's 
choice not to accord such respect to the prima facie case ruling is 
clearly 
not an unreasonable one. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge concurring in part, and dissenting in 
part: 
 
I join sections II, III, and IV of the majority opinion, 
however I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
District Attorney's implementation of Pa. R. Crim. P. 544 is 





Under Pa. R. Crim. P. 544, the Philadelphia District 
Attorney's Office has adopted a practice of re-arresting 
some defendants immediately after a Municipal Court 
Judge has discharged felony charges at a preliminary 
hearing. The discharges are based upon the judge's 
conclusion that the defendant's continued detention is not 
supported by probable cause. The re-arrests do not result 
from any additional evidence, or changed circumstances. 
An Assistant District Attorney merely restamps the same 
criminal complaint that was originally filed. The defendant 
is then immediately re-arrested on the same charges that 
have just been dismissed even though a judge has just 
ruled that the evidence offered in support of the those 
charges is insufficient to support them.2  Rule 544 does not 
require this practice, nor can it legitimize this practice. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the majority notes, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entered an 
order reorganizing and renumbering the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure on Mach 1, 2000. Like my colleagues, I use the current 
numbering system throughout this dissent. 
 
2. My colleagues suggest that the decision to re-arrest may have been 
based on additional information that the prosecutor learned from some 
"database" and that this information may not have been known when 
the judge discharged the felony charges. See Maj. Op. at 14 ("The 
database that the Commonwealth may consult in determining whether 
there is probable cause for a second arrest is different from and more 
comprehensive than, the database to which consideration is limited at 
the preliminary hearing."). It is not at all clear what this data base is, 
where it came from, or what it contains. 
 
The only thing that is clear about this "database" is that there is no 
mention of it in the record, and that the prosecutor did not have time to 
consult any such "database" before Stewart was re-arrested. That re- 
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II. Applicable Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
 
Under Pa. R. Crim. P. 518(a), a defendant in Philadelphia 
County who is charged in a complaint with a felony and 
arrested without a warrant is detained pending a 
preliminary arraignment. That preliminary arraignment 
usually occurs within 24 hours of the defendant's arrest. 
See Pa. R. Crim. P. 518(a). At the preliminary arraignment 
a Bail Commissioner, functioning as the "issuing 
authority," informs the defendant of his/her rights, 
including the right to counsel, and appoints counsel if 
necessary.3 The defendant is also given a copy of the 
criminal complaint that has been accepted for filing, Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 540(a), 520, 523 and unless a defendant who is 
represented by counsel waives a preliminary hearing, the 
Bail Commissioner/issuing authority must also set a date 
for a preliminary hearing before a Philadelphia Municipal 
Court judge. That date can be "no less than 3 nor more 
than 10 days after the preliminary arraignment." Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 540(e)(1). 
 
If the Commonwealth is able to establish a prima facie 
case for a felony charge at the ensuing preliminary hearing, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
arrest here occurred as soon as the judge dismissed the felony charges. 
Stewart was apparently arrested in the courtroom, and in front of the 
judge who had just ruled that there was no probable cause to support 
his detention on those charges. Moreover, the District Attorney has not 
even attempted to justify this practice by relying on some unspecified 
database of additional information that would have supported the 
dismissed charges if the judge had only known about it. 
 
3. In 1984, the Pennsylvania General Assembly created the office of Bail 
Commissioner for the Philadelphia Municipal Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 1123(a); see also Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 62 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (noting creation of Bail Commissioner position by the 
Pennsylvania legislature). In 1994, former Rule 140 (now Rule 540) of 
the Pa. R. Crim. P. was amended to require the "issuing authority" at a 
preliminary arraignment to determine probable cause. Pa. R. Crim. P. 
540(c). This amendment to Rule 140 was adopted in response to County 
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), wherein the Supreme 
Court held that a probable cause determination must generally be made 
within 48 hours of arrest. In Philadelphia County, the issuing authority 
is the bail commissioner. 
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the Municipal Court Judge orders the defendant held for 
trial in the Court of Common Pleas on the felony charge(s). 
If the Municipal Court judge dismisses all felony charges 
due to lack of evidence or lack of prosecution so that only 
misdemeanor charges remain, the defendant is tried on 
those misdemeanor charges in Municipal Court. See Pa. R. 
Crim. P. 543(a), 1001(A). If the Municipal Court Judge at 
the preliminary hearing concludes that the Commonwealth 
has not established a prima facie case on any of the 
charges, the judge must discharge the defendant unless a 
continuance is granted pursuant to a request "supported by 
reasonable grounds." See Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(D).4 
 
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect in 
Pennsylvania before January 1, 2000, if a Municipal Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority notes that the District Attorney suggests that the most 
common reason defendants are immediately re-arrested at the 
preliminary hearing is because important witnesses fail to appear thus 
compromising the Commonwealth's ability to establish probable cause. 
See Maj. Op. at 15. However, that was not the case here. The 
prosecution presented all of the evidence against Stewart it wanted to, 
and a judge ruled that evidence insufficient to detain him on felony 
charges. 
 
Inasmuch as Rule 542(D) specifies that a prosecutor may request a 
continuance "supported by reasonable grounds," I fail to see why re- 
arrest and imprisonment rather than requesting a continuance is the 
favored response to a witnesses failure to appear. Requiring the 
prosecutor to request a continuance rather than automatically resorting 
to the expediency of detention places no burden whatsoever on the 
Commonwealth. It merely requires that the prosecutor offer an 
explanation for the witnesses failure to appear, and assumes that a 
judge will evaluate the adequacy of the explanation. This is no more than 
is required of lawyers in criminal and civil courtrooms all over this 
country everyday. Prosecutors in Philadelphia County are as able as the 
lawyers elsewhere, and I fail to see why the Assistant District Attorneys 
in Philadelphia are not required to request a continuance and offer an 
explanation for a witnesses failure to appear just like other lawyers are 
expected to. This would allow a judge to gauge the efforts that were 
made to produce the witness and also afford an opportunity for the judge 
to decide if bail should be continued or reduced if the continuance is 
granted. Under the current practice a defendant can be re-arrested and 
detained in jail even if the witness did not appear because of some 
dereliction on the part of the prosecutor. 
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judge dismissed criminal charges at the preliminary hearing 
due to lack of evidence or lack of prosecution, the attorney 
for the Commonwealth could reinstitute charges by 
submitting a new criminal complaint and an affidavit of 
probable cause to a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. 
See Phila. Crim. R. 500(H). However, a warrant for the 
defendant's re-arrest would only issue if the court approved 
the submission. If the initial dismissal of charges in the 
Municipal Court was based on a finding of no probable 
cause, the preliminary hearing following any re-arrest was 
scheduled before a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. In 
all cases, however, a re-arrest could proceed only after a 
judicial officer had approved a resubmission and 
determined that there was indeed probable cause for the re- 
arrest. 
 
On January 1, 2000, the current version of Pa. R. Crim. 
P. 544 (then Pa. R. Crim P. 143) went into effect. The Rule 
provides: 
 
       Reinstituting Charges Following Withdrawal or 
       Dismissal. 
 
       (A) When charges are dismissed or withdrawn at, or 
       prior to, a preliminary hearing, the attorney for the 
       Commonwealth may reinstitute the charges by 
       approving, in writing, the refiling of a complaint with 
       the issuing authority who dismissed or permitted the 
       withdrawal of the charges. 
 
       (B) Following the refiling of a complaint pursuant to 
       paragraph (A), if the attorney for the Commonwealth 
       determines that the preliminary hearing should be 
       conducted by a different issuing authority, the attorney 
       shall file a Rule 23 motion with the clerk of courts 
       requesting that the president judge, or a judge 
       designated by the president judge, assign a different 
       issuing authority to conduct the preliminary hearing. 
       The motion shall set forth reasons for requesting a 
       different issuing authority. 
 
Pa. R. Crim. P. 544. Nothing in the text of that rule requires 
the defendant's re-arrest pending completion of the second 
preliminary hearing. That practice arises from the specific 
policy at issue here, not from the language of the Rule. 
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The majority believes that Stewart is asking us"to 
deprive Pennsylvania of its right to reinitiate a criminal 
proceeding" following discharge of felony charges at a 
preliminary hearing. Maj. Op. at 12. The majority concludes 
that "[t]here is no precedent of which we are aware, . . . for 
the proposition that the federal Constitution prohibits the 
reinitiation of a criminal proceeding in such a manner 
where double jeopardy has not attached and no pattern of 
prosecutorial harassment has been alleged." Id. However, 
that framing of the issue mischaracterizes the relief Stewart 
is seeking as well as the district court's order. The district 
court only enjoined the District Attorney from "ordering the 
re-arrest and detention, without judicial authorization, of 
any persons on any charge which has been dismissed by a 
Philadelphia Municipal Court judge at a preliminary 
hearing because of the failure of the Commonwealth .. . to 
establish probable cause or a prima facie case," id. at 5, 
and that is all Stewart is asking us to do. 
 
The injunction does not preclude prosecutions; it 
precludes unauthorized detentions. It prevents the District 
Attorney from detaining a defendant pending a second 
preliminary hearing where a judge has dismissed the felony 
charges holding a defendant in custody. It also prevents the 
prosecutor's assessment of probable cause from 
outweighing and reversing a judicial determination of 
probable cause. I do not think a request to do that is all 
that extraordinary. 
 
Accordingly, the majority's declaration that "[t]he District 
Court's injunction bars the District Attorney from ever 
reinitiating charges without prior judicial approval, no 
matter how much additional incriminating information she 
learns in the course of her investigation," is simply wrong. 
See Maj. Op. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
 
Moreover, the District Attorney is not even arguing that 
enforcing the district court's injunction has the effect the 
majority assigns to it; nor could she. In discussions 
between the District Attorney's Office, the Defender 
Association of Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia Municipal 
Court, the District Attorney initially proposed that 
prosecutions be reinitiated under Rule 544 by simply 
refiling charges immediately after the Municipal Court 
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dismissal without re-arresting the defendant. Pursuant to 
that policy, the refiled case would have received a new date 
for a preliminary hearing and the defendant would have 
received a subpoena to appear on that new date. For 
reasons unknown to us, the Defender Association and the 
Municipal Court rejected that proposal. Accordingly, since 
April 17, 2000, the District Attorney has ordered some 
defendants re-arrested with no additional judicial 
determination of probable cause under Rule 544. The 
prosecutor simply refiles identical charges and those 
defendants are immediately taken into custody to await a 
new preliminary arraignment on refiled charges that are 
identical to charges that have just been dismissed by a judge.5 
Dist. Court Op. at 4. 
 
III. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits These Re- 
Arrests. 
 
The Fourth Amendment attempts to guard against 
unreasonable restrictions on liberty by requiring that an 
arrest be supported by probable cause, and that, where 
possible, a neutral magistrate determine if probable cause 
exists.6 Thus, in Katz v. United States, in referring to the 
threshold showing needed for a search under the Fourth 
Amendment the Court stated, "searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-- subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions." 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
More than half a century ago, the Supreme Court declared, 
"[t]o provide the necessary security against unreasonable 
intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers 
of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial 
processes wherever possible." Trupiano v. United States, 
334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (emphasis added), overruled on 




5. It is not clear how the District Attorney decides who will be 
immediately re-arrested in this manner, and who will not be. 
 
6. The Fourteenth Amendment extends the Fourth Amendment's 
guarantee against unreasonable search or seizure to the states. See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) the Supreme 
Court addressed the inherent tension between protecting 
an individual's liberty on the one hand, and the real world 
necessities of law enforcement on the other. The Court 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment resolves that 
tension by allowing a warrantless arrest under certain, 
limited circumstances. The resulting compromise achieves 
the necessary balance between law enforcement and 
individual liberty because "a policeman's on-the-scene 
assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for 
arresting a person suspected of a crime, and for a brief 
period of detention to take the administrative steps incident 
to arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 114. 
 
The defendants in Gerstein were arrested pursuant to a 
prosecutor's information. Under applicable Florida rules 
and statutes, prosecutors could charge noncapital offenses 
by information without a preliminary hearing or leave of 
court. State courts had previously held that the 
prosecutor's filing of an information "foreclosed the 
suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. State courts had 
also held that habeas corpus was only available to 
challenge the probable cause for detention pursuant to an 
information under "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 106. 
"As a result, a person charged by information could be 
detained for a substantial period solely on the decision of 
the prosecutor." Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court framed 
the issue as follows: "whether a person arrested and held 
for trial under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally 
entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for 
pretrial restraint of liberty." Id. at 104. Stated another way, 
the issue was, "whether a person arrested and held for trial 
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination of 
probable cause for detention. . . ." Id. at 111. 
 
The Court began its analysis of that question by 
discussing the aforementioned practical limitations that 
arise from the practicalities of law enforcement. The Court 
observed: 
 
       Maximum protection of individual rights could be 
       assured by requiring a magistrate's view of the factual 
       justification prior to any arrest, but such a 
       requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap 
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       for legitimate law enforcement. Thus, while the Court 
       has expressed a preference for the use of arrest 
       warrants when feasible, it has never invalidated an 
       arrest supported by probable cause solely because the 
       officers failed to secure a warrant. 
 
420 U.S. at 113. However, the relaxation of the warrant 
requirement is tightly tethered to circumstances that are 
sufficiently compelling to justify relaxing the protection 
endemic in review by a neutral magistrate. When such 
exceptional circumstances exist, "a policeman's on-the- 
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal 
justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and 
for a brief period of detention to take the administrative 
steps incident to arrest." Id. 
 
The necessity of allowing a police officer to react as 
circumstances unfold "on-the-scene" does not, however, 
minimize the importance of a suspect's liberty, nor 
permanently degrade his/her entitlement to having a 
judicial officer review the resulting arrest to determine if it 
was, in fact, reasonable. "Once the suspect is in custody, 
. . .[ ] the reasons justifying dispensing with the 
magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. . . . And, while 
the State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the 
suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable 
cause increases significantly." Id. at 114. 
 
The situation here is, of course, a bit different than the 
situation in Gerstein. Stewart actually received a probable 
cause hearing before a neutral magistrate. However, therein 
lies the proverbial "rub." As set forth above, that neutral 
magistrate determined that there was no probable cause to 
justify Stewart's continued restraint. Yet, despite this 
judicial determination, and perhaps to spite it, Stewart was 
immediately re-arrested under Rule 544 based solely upon 
the prosecutor's certification and filing. Therefore, although 
Stewart's initial arrest may well have been occasioned by an 
officer's on-the-scene observations or averments in a 
complaint, the circumstances after the arrest are not so 
extraordinary as to allow the prosecutor's assessment of 
probable cause to justify re-arrest if a neutral magistrate 
determines that there is no probable cause to support that 
re-arrest. 
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Stewart's case illustrates the constitutional infirmities of 
the District Attorney's policy. As noted above, the victim of 
the charged assault testified at Stewart's preliminary 
hearing, and the Commonwealth offered no other evidence 
to support the charged felony. After hearing that witness 
testify, the Municipal Court Judge ruled that Stewart could 
only be held for court on misdemeanor assault, and 
dismissed the felony of aggravated assault. Inasmuch as 
judges are not permitted to make credibility determinations 
at the preliminary hearing stage, it is clear that the 
Municipal Court Judge hearing the victim's testimony 
concluded that the testimony was insufficient as a matter 
of law to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault even if 
the testimony were true. See Commonwealth v. McBride, 
595 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1991). Yet, even though a judge ruled 
that the testimony of the victim was not sufficient to hold 
Stewart on the charge of felonious aggravated assault, 
Stewart was immediately re-arrested for that very charge, 
and jailed for at least two more weeks. Stewart was re- 
arrested (apparently before he could leave the courtroom), 
and thereafter jailed because he could not post bail a 
second time. 
 
Nothing on this record establishes any "exigency" to 
justify that re-arrest. Although my colleagues postulate that 
the prosecutor's decision to re-arrest was based upon 
information gleaned from some sort of secret "database," it 
is clear that nothing on this record rises to the level of 
practical necessity that allows law enforcement officers to 
act upon on-the-scene judgments they are required to make 
while patrolling public streets. This is especially true when 
one considers that a judge has heard all of the evidence the 
prosecution had to offer and concluded that the 
Commonwealth could not legally detain Stewart on felony 
charges. See Gerstein, supra. 
 
I am, of course, aware that Stewart's detention under 
Rule 544 was substantially shorter than that which 
troubled the Supreme Court in Gerstein. I also realize that 
the second preliminary hearing must be held promptly after 
re-arrest under Rule 544. See County of Riverside v 
McClaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The majority relies upon 
the 48 hour limit incorporated into Rule 544 to uphold the 
 
                                25 
 
 
District Attorney's argument that she is free to re-arrest 
based only upon the prosecutor's assessment of probable 
cause provided that defendants receive a prompt judicial 
determination of probable cause as required by Gerstein 
and County of Riverside. See Maj. Op. at 11-12. 
 
The majority concludes that the determination of 
probable cause made by the "issuing authority" at the 
preliminary arraignment provides the legal basis for the re- 
arrest after the preliminary hearing. My colleagues thus 
accept the District Attorney's distinction between the 
standard at the preliminary arraignment and the standard 
at the preliminary hearing. The majority agrees that 
dismissal at the preliminary hearing is based on a failure to 
meet a different, and substantially higher threshold, than 
that established at a preliminary arraignment. See Maj. Op. 
at 12 ("The Pennsylvania law requiring probable cause for 
arrests and a preliminary arraignment within 48 hours 
satisfies all that the Fourth Amendment requires, and there 
is no reason to believe that law was not fully complied with 
here.") (citing Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam , 678 A.2d 
342, 347-48, n.10 (Pa. 1996)). A close examination of the 
nature of preliminary hearings and preliminary 
arraignments illustrates the weakness of my colleagues' 
analysis. 
 
As noted above, Pa. R. Crim. P. 540 establishes certain 
procedures that an issuing authority must follow at the 
preliminary arraignment following a warrantless arrest. It 
includes a requirement that the issuing authority determine 
if there is probable cause for the arrest. If probable cause 
is found, the issuing authority must inform the defendant 
of the charges filed against him/her, appoint counsel and 
otherwise explain the right to counsel, set bail (assuming 
the defendant was arrested for a bailable offense), and 
inform the defendant of "the right to have a preliminary 
hearing." Pa. R. Crim. P. 540(d). The Rule also provides that 
"[u]nless the preliminary hearing is waived by a defendant 
who is represented by counsel," the issuing authority must 
set a date for a preliminary hearing "which shall not be less 
than 3 nor more than 10 days after the preliminary 
arraignment." Id. 
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The preliminary arraignment is often held before a 
defendant is represented by counsel, and the Rule provides 
the procedure for appointing counsel in such a case, and 
setting a date for a preliminary hearing (unless a defendant 
who is represented by counsel waives it). It is therefore 
clear from the context of the Rule that the preliminary 
arraignment is designed to inform the defendant of his/her 
rights, and provide a mechanism for setting bail, and 
appointing counsel. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
made this quite clear in the context of Pa. R. Crim. P. 516. 
In addressing the role of the preliminary arraignment 
following an arrest pursuant to a warrant under Rule 516, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated: 
 
       Rule 516 (formerly Rule 123) of the Pennsylvania Rules 
       of Criminal Procedure requires that a person who is 
       arrested be brought before a judicial officer for 
       preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay. 
       The purpose of this requirement is to protect an 
       accused's right to know the nature and cause of the 
       accusation against him, his right to counsel, and his 
       right to reasonable bail.7 
 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 760 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa. Super. 
2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395, 403, 
525 A.2d 1177, 1181 (1987)) (emphasis added). If the 
Commonwealth is unable to establish a prima facie case at 
the preliminary arraignment, the defendant must be 
discharged. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(D). 
 
Rule 516 (formally Rule 123) was enacted in 1995 in 
response to the Supreme Court's decision in County of 
Riverside. There, the Court required a probable cause 
determination "as soon as is reasonably feasible, but in no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Rule 516 requires that a defendant who is arrested with a warrant 
must be afforded a preliminary arraignment "without delay." Pa. R. Crim. 
P. 516 (emphasis added). Rule 540 then establishes the requirements for 
all preliminary arraignments. 
 
It can be argued that Rule 516 does not focus on probable cause 
because it only applies when a defendant has been arrested pursuant to 
a warrant. Therefore, the neutral magistrate that issued the warrant has 
already determined probable cause to arrest. However, as I discuss 
below, Pennsylvania courts have not made that distinction. 
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event later than 48 hours after arrest." See Commonwealth 
v. Abdul-Salaam, 678 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1996) (applying 
Riverside probable cause determination requirements to 
Pennsylvania criminal procedure). 
 
The probable cause determination that is the focus of our 
inquiry is, of course, made during a preliminary hearing. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the 
function and importance of the preliminary hearing under 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
 
       The basic principles of law with respect to the purpose 
       of a preliminary hearing are well established. The 
       preliminary hearing is not a trial. The principal function 
       of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual's 
       right against an unlawful arrest and detention. At this 
       hearing the Commonwealth bears the burden of 
       establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has 
       been committed and that the accused is probably the 
       one who committed it. It is not necessary for the 
       Commonwealth to establish at this stage the accused's 
       guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to meet its 
       burden at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth 
       is required to present evidence with regard to each of 
       the material elements of the charge and to establish 
       sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief that the 
       accused committed the offense. 
 
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also 
Commonwealth v. Hetherington, 331 A.2d 205, 208 (Pa. 
1975). Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the preliminary 
hearing is intended to insure that the government can 
establish sufficient facts to justify further detention. The 
"probable cause determination" at the preliminary 
arraignment is merely intended to insure that 
circumstances justify holding the defendant for the 3 to 10 
days it will take for the Commonwealth to present evidence 
of its prima facie case at the probable cause determination 
that occurs at the preliminary hearing. My colleagues state 
the following in discussing the distinction between the 
preliminary hearing, and preliminary arraignment: 
 
       it is not at all clear to us that the "probable cause" 
       standard and the "prima facie case" standard under 
 
                                28 
 
 
       Pennsylvania law require the Commonwealth to provide 
       the same level of assurance that the subject has 
       committed a crime. The different terms chosen to 
       describe the Commonwealth's burden at the time of 
       arrest and preliminary arraignment and its burden at 
       the time of the preliminary hearings, suggest to us that 
       prima facie case standard was intended to require 
       different and greater assurance of guilt. "Probable 
       cause," of course, speaks in terms of a probability 
       while "prima facie case" has been defined by the 
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court as evidence "such that if 
       presented at the trial in court, and accepted as true, 
       the judge would be warranted in letting the trial go to 
       the jury." 
 
Maj. Op. at 13. Although the majority concludes that the 
distinction between probable cause and prima facie case "is 
not at all clear" under the controlling law; Pennsylvania 
courts have stated that it is clear to them that no 
distinction exists. As noted above, the evidence that the 
Commonwealth presents at the preliminary hearing must 
be "accepted as true," see Commonwealth v McBride, 595 
A.2d 589 (Pa. 1991), just as the evidence at the preliminary 
arraignment must be. 
 
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has said: 
 
       [I]t is clear that the concept of establishing a prima 
       facie case is inextricably tied to a showing of probable 
       cause. That is, for the Commonwealth to establish a 
       prima facie case they need to show probable cause that 
       the accused committed the offense. Therefore, a finding 
       by the magistrate that the Commonwealth did not 
       establish probable cause that the appellant committed 
       the violations for which he was charged is the same as 
       a finding that the Commonwealth did not establish a 
       prima facie case. Thus contrary to appellant's 
       assertion, there is no legal distinction to the choice of 
       phraseology that the magistrate may have employed in 
       dismissing the charges against him. 
 
Commonwealth v. Sebek, 716 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa. Super. 
1998) (emphasis added). As noted above, in Philadelphia 
County, the determination at the preliminary hearing is 
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made by a Municipal Court Judge. The determination at 
the preliminary arraignment is made by a Bail 
Commissioner. It is the Municipal Court Judge presiding at 
the preliminary hearing whom Pennsylvania law charges 
with ensuring that the government is justified in depriving 
the suspect of his/her liberty. In McBride, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court expressed no difficulty in concluding that: 
"the sole function [of the judge at a preliminary hearing] is 
to determine whether probable cause exists to require an 
accused to stand trial on the charges. . . ." 595 A.2d at 
592. In Gerstein, the Court noted that "the sole issue" at 
the probable cause hearing required by the Fourth 
Amendment "is whether there is probable cause for 
detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. 
. . . The standard is the same as that for arrest. That 
standard -- probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime. . . ." 420 U.S. at 120. Here, that 
determination was made at the preliminary hearing by the 
Municipal Court judge. 
 
The majority bases its conclusion that probable cause is 
distinct from the prima facie case in Pennsylvania on 
Commonwealth v. Cartegena, 393 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1978) 
(plurality opinion) (finding probable cause existed for the 
institution of criminal proceedings, though a prima facie 
case had not been established); Commonwealth v. Days, 
718 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 1998) ("[p]robable cause is 
based on a finding of probability, not a prima facie showing 
of criminal activity"); and Commonwealth v. Scott, 420 A.2d 
717, 720 (Pa. Super. 1980) ("It would be unreasonable to 
require payment of costs every time the Commonwealth 
wanted to challenge a finding of lack of prima facie case 
when there had not even been a hint of harassment or 
failure to show probable cause."). See Maj. Op. at 14. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Cartagena, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did state that: "[t]he Pennsylvania courts 
have recognized that the standard of probable cause and 
the prima facie case standard are conceptually distinct." 
However, the district court carefully considered Cartagena, 
and was not persuaded. The district court's analysis of 
Cartagena is worth repeating here because it fully and 
accurately disposes of the District Attorney's reliance on 
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that case. The district court relied upon McBride in stating 
the following: 
 
       While the District Attorney was unable to articulate 
       any practical distinction between the terms probable 
       cause and prima facie case, she directs us to 
       Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 393 A.2d 350, 355 
       (1978), in support of her position. While Cartagena 
       seems to say that prima facie case and probable cause 
       are different concepts under Pennsylvania law, it does 
       not define them or explain the difference. Cartagena 
       was decided over fifteen years before the institution of 
       the present two-level system whereby a bail 
       commissioner not learned in the law makes a probable 
       cause determination and a Municipal Court judge 
       thereafter makes a prima facie case determination. 
       McBride, which was decided in 1991, has been 
       construed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court to mean 
       that the probable cause and prima facie case 
       determinations are the same. 
 
Stewart v. Abraham, 2000 WL 1022958 *7 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(citations omitted). I agree. Moreover, it is important to note 
that, in Cartagena, unlike here, the District Attorney did 
not simply refile identical charges and seek to re-arrest a 
defendant without judicial intervention after a judge ruled 
that the prosecution did not establish probable cause for 
the initial charges. Instead: 
 
       Appellant was arrested on May 31, 1975. A preliminary 
       hearing was held in the Municipal Court of 
       Philadelphia on June 5, 1975. The court took the 
       matter under advisement and after hearing argument, 
       found that a Prima facie case had not been established. 
       The court ordered appellant discharged on June 13, 
       1975. 
 
       The Commonwealth then drew up another more 
       detailed criminal complaint and another arrest 
       warrant. These documents were presented to a judge of 
       the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia who signed 
       the documents on June 16, 1975. Appellant was re- 
       arrested, and following a preliminary hearing before 
       another judge of the Court of Common Pleas of 
       Philadelphia, appellant was held for trial . . . . 
 
                                31 
 
 
393 A.2d at 354. Accordingly, the District Attorney in 
Cartagena did not substitute his own determination for that 
of a neutral magistrate as the prosecutor seeks to do here. 
Moreover, in reaching the decision in Cartagena the Court 
stated, "[w]hen the magistrate believes that probable cause 
to hold the defendant has not been proven, he may 
discharge him; . . . If the Commonwealth deems itself 
aggrieved by his decision it may bring the matter again 
before any other officer empowered to hold preliminary 
hearings." Id. Thus, Cartagena assumes judicial approval 
for a second arrest following discharge at a preliminary 
hearing. 
 
The majority's reliance upon a pronouncement of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Scott, is 
also unconvincing. There, the court did state: "[i]t would be 
unreasonable to require payment of costs every time the 
Commonwealth wanted to challenge a finding of lack of 
prima facie case when there had not even been a hint of 
harassment or failure to show probable cause." 420 A.2d at 
720. Indeed, the issue in Scott was the assessment of costs 
under then applicable Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(d). The Rule 
allowed costs to be taxed against the government if it did 
not establish a prima facie case "at the first preliminary 
hearing." Id. at 719. It also gave judges the discretion to 
discharge a defendant if, despite the prior discharge, 
"further proceedings on the same cause [were brought] 
without payment" Id. The decision does not establish a 
distinction between a prima facie case and probable cause, 
nor does it infer any such distinction. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that even there, in 1980, the court used 
"probable cause" and "prima facie case" interchangeably as 
though the distinction my colleagues seek to draw did not 
exist. Id at 720. For example the court noted, 
 
       [i]t is especially unlikely that the intent of the Rule as 
       revised was to require the payment of the cost . . . prior 
       to any second prosecution because re-arrest and a 
       second preliminary hearing is the only route open to 
       the Commonwealth to test an issuing authority's 
       judgment that a prima facie case has not been made 
       out. It would be unreasonable to require payment of 
       costs every time the Commonwealth wanted to 
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       challenge a finding of lack of a prima facie case when 
       there had not even been a hint of harassment or failure 
       to show probable cause. 
 
420 A.2d at 720. 
 
I am also not persuaded by the majority's citation to 
Commonwealth v. Days. There, the defendant was arrested 
following execution of a search warrant. The search 
conducted pursuant to that warrant revealed numerous 
vials of cocaine on her person and in her apartment, and 
she was convicted for possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver. On appeal, she challenged the trial 
court's conclusion that probable cause existed for the 
search. In affirming the trial court's ruling, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court did state: "[p]robable cause is 
based on a finding of probability, not a prima facie showing 
of criminal activity," 718 A.2d at 1800, as my colleagues 
note. However, the court then stated: "[t]he duty of this 
Court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Id. Here, 
of course, the magistrate concluded that probable cause did 
not exist, and I fail to see how Days supports the 
proposition that the prosecutor is licensed to ignore that 
ruling.8 
 
Essentially then, we are asked to decide if the Fourth 
Amendment will tolerate a situation where an individual 
can be detained solely upon the certification of a prosecutor 
even though a judicial officer has determined that the 
prosecutor lacks probable cause for the defendant's 
continued detention. That question answers itself. I do not 
think that any system of ordered liberty based upon respect 
for a judiciary charged with interpreting neutral legal 
principles can condone the practice that the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. I realize that the Commonwealth is limited to admissible evidence at 
the preliminary hearing, whereas hearsay may be considered at the 
preliminary arraignment, and the majority's assertion that this creates a 
significant distinction between the prima facie  case and the probable 
cause determination is not without force. However, given the strength of 
the authorities that suggest a contrary result, I can not agree that this 
distinction is so significant as to support the distinction the majority 
seeks to draw between those two proceedings. 
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Attorney urges upon us under its application of Rule 544 
and which my colleagues have sanctioned. 
 
My colleagues believe that Stewart is asking us"to bar 
the state from exercising its right to arrest when it believes 
in good faith that it has probable cause." See Maj. Op. at 
16. I agree that nothing on this record suggests that 
Stewart's re-arrest was the result of bad faith. However, the 
constitutional analysis here does not turn on the good faith 
of the prosecutor. The issue is more fundamental than that. 
Even if such re-arrests always result solely from good faith 
beliefs of the prosecutor in the courtroom, the 
constitutional equation would still not balance in favor of 
allowing the prosecutor's judgment to negate the actions of 
a judicial officer who has just ruled that there is not a 
sufficient basis to deprive the defendant of his/her liberty 
on felony charges. 
 
       [A] prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is 
       inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral 
       and detached magistrate. . . . Probable Cause for the 
       issuance of an arrest warrant must be determined by 
       someone independent of police and prosecution. 
 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117-8. 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has already rejected the 
argument that a defendant's liberty interest can be held 
captive to the discretion of prosecutors in this manner. In 
Gerstein, the Court stated: "[a]lthough a conscientious 
decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a 
measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do 
not think prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 420 U.S. at 117. 
 
It can hardly be otherwise. Anyone experienced in the 
emotions of criminal trials will realize what real world 
practicalities suggest. The prosecutor's motivations in 
causing a re-arrest under Rule 544 may often, at least in 
part, result from a sincerely held belief that the defendant 
"beat the case" or "got over" on the prosecutor. Such 
feelings may often be based upon little more than the 
emotions that are inherent in the adversarial process, 
and/or the prosecutor's obviously biased conclusions about 
the strength of his/her case. A system that conditions an 
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individual's liberty on those motivations can hardly offer 
the protection that the Fourth Amendment requires; no 
matter how well-intentioned the prosecutor may be. 
 
       Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards 
       must be provided against the dangers of the 
       overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful 
       instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to 
       a single functionary. The complicated process of 
       criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, 
       responsibility for which is separately vested in the 
       various participants upon whom the criminal law relies 
       for its vindication. 
 
Id. at 118 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 
(1943)). That is why we have neutral magistrates, that is 
why the Supreme Court restricted the prosecution's 
authority to detain absent review of a neutral magistrate, 
and that is why the district court enjoined the policy that 
has been implemented under Rule 544 in Philadelphia 
County. 
 
The requirement that a neutral magistrate evaluate 
probable cause amounts to precious little if it can be 
nullified by the prosecutor's certification that probable 
cause exists, especially when the certification is made 
immediately after a judge has ruled to the contrary. A 
prosecutor's "official oath [can] not furnish probable cause. 
. . ." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117. The prosecutor is in 
substantially the same position as a law enforcement officer 
who believes his/her view of the case to be correct, and 
his/her cause to be righteous. More than half a century 
ago, the Court stated 
 
       [t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often 
       not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
       enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
       reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection 
       consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by 
       a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
       judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
       enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
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Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).9 
 
If a defendant can not initially be detained "solely on the 
decision of a prosecutor," it would stand the Constitution 
on its head to allow the prosecutor that power after a judge 
has ruled that the prosecutor lacks probable cause to 
detain the defendant, and orders felony charges discharged. 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106. The fact that a non-law trained 
Bail Commissioner may have previously held the defendant 
for court at a time when the defendant may not have been 
represented by counsel does not change the equation. 
 
In Gerstein the Court determined that the practicalities 
that justified an initial warrantless arrest could not justify 
continued detention without a judicial determination of 
probable cause. Here, the Commonwealth asserts that 
practicalities justify continued detention for a brief period 
to allow it to establish the probable cause that it believes 
exists. However, the focus on practicality of prosecution 
and the brevity of the detention misses the point. It 
requires us to minimize both the importance of one's 
liberty, and the proper role of the judge in determining the 
reasonableness of an arrest. 
 
The detention that results in these cases may well be 
brief when compared to the more lengthy pretrial 
detentions in Gerstein. However, we ought not to devalue 
one's liberty to the extent of condoning even a brief period 
of incarceration following a warrantless arrest unless a 
neutral magistrate concludes that the prosecution has 
established probable cause. No informed officer of the court 
can seriously regard this procedural protection as a 
troublesome legal technicality, and I doubt that any 
prosecutor who is truly operating in good faith would 
regard it as such. "The history of liberty has largely been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We have previously noted that the competitive atmosphere of litigation 
will sometimes give rise to mixed motives on the part of an advocate 
(there, it was the prosecutor) attempting to admit evidence in a criminal 
trial. In United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992) we 
stated, "Although the government will hardly admit it, the reasons 
proffered to admit prior bad act evidence . . . is often mixed between an 
urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to impugn the 
defendant's character." 
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the history of observance of procedural safeguards and the 
effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires 
disregard of fair procedures imposed by law." McNabb v. 
U.S., 318 U.S.332, 347 (1943). 
 
Moreover, the brevity of the incarceration that follows re- 
arrest does not weigh nearly as heavily in the balance 
under these circumstances as the majority concludes. The 
Supreme Court has noted that circumstances may make a 
delay constitutionally unreasonable even if a probable 
cause hearing occurs within 48 hours of an arrest. While 
establishing the 48 hour rule for probable cause 
determinations in County of Riverside, the Court cautioned: 
 
       This is not to say that the probable cause 
       determination in a particular case passes 
       constitutional muster simply because it is provided 
       within 48 hours. Such a hearing may nonetheless 
       violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove 
       that his or her probable cause determination was 
       delayed unreasonably. 
 
500 U.S. at 56.10 The Court then provided examples of such 
unreasonable delay. It proclaimed: "Examples of 
unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering 
additional evidence to justify the arrest, . . . ." Id. That is 
precisely what we have here. Therefore, I believe the 
majority places far too much reliance on the fact that the 
preliminary arraignments occur within 48 hours of arrest. 
See Maj. Op. at 12. ("The Pennsylvania law requiring 
probable cause for arrests and a preliminary arraignment 
within 48 hours satisfies all that the Fourth Amendment 
requires, . . .").11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In a different context, the Supreme Court has declared, "Authority 
does not suggest that a minimal amount of additional time in prison 
cannot constitute prejudice [under a Strickland analysis of competency 
of counsel]. Quite to the contrary, our jurisprudence suggests that any 
amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance." Glover v. 
United States, 121 S.Ct. 696, 700 (2001). (Emphasis added). 
 
11. The majority states that Stewart's arrest would have violated the 
Fourth Amendment if it had been made without probable cause, but 
concludes that "Stewart has not attempted to show. . . that the district 
attorney lacked probable cause at the time of his arrest or anyone 
 





For the reasons outlined above, I must respectfully 
disagree with the majority opinion insofar as my colleagues 
conclude that the district court erred in enjoining the 
District Attorney's current policy under Rule 544. 
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else's." The majority notes that "the record does not reveal . . . what 
information was presented to the neutral magistrate at Stewart's second 
preliminary arraignment and was found to constitute probable cause." 
See Maj. Op. at 12, n. 4. 
 
The record does, however, show that a judge ruled that the 
Commonwealth did not have probable cause to detain Stewart on the 
felony charges he was arrested for immediately after the judge made that 
ruling. Therefore, I believe that the majority's focus on the second 
preliminary arraignment is misplaced. The arrest had already occurred, 
and there is no dispute that a judge had already ruled that the 
Commonwealth had not presented the Municipal Court Judge (the 
relevant "neutral magistrate") with probable cause to support that arrest. 
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